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Non-technical summary
The Eastern European Associates have committed themselves to reduce their
emissions of greenhouse gases in 2010 according to their targets set in the Kyoto Protocol.
Furthermore since 1993 trade liberalization has taken place between all associated countries
and the EU as agreed in the Europe Agreements. There is meanwhile a bulk of literature
providing quantitative evidence on the economic effects of the full integration of the Central
and East European Countries into the EU (Francois 1997, Baldwin, Francois and Portes 1997)
as well as the Kyoto Protocol (Weyant 1999 and IPCC 2001). However, there is a lack of
quantitative research on the linkage of trade and the environment in the context of the EU
enlargement. As a burden from the previous system the CEE countries inherited a
significantly damaged environment. The cheap and subsidized energy, lack of market pricing
and weak budget constraints distorted the efficient allocation of the available resources and
led to overuse and excessive pollution (Klarer and Moldan 1997). In addition to the
implementation of other international environmental treaties (e.g. Kyoto Protocol, Sulfur
protocol), a pre-condition for the EU membership for the CEEC is the adoption and
implementation of the EU environmental acquis. This might become a considerable burden
for several countries, when others than the cost-efficient ways will be followed. The
following questions arise: “What are the common repercussions of the trade and
environmental policies?” “Is it justified to search for a certain combination of both measures,
in order to exploit the advantages of each one?” The theoretical literature on the linkage
between trade and environment points out especially the spillover effects of the countries’
environmental policy action. These studies deal mainly with the impacts of abatement policies
on industrial competitiveness and carbon leakage i.e. the reallocation of industries. The
international spillovers are mainly transmitted through changes in the terms of trade. The
adoption of mitigation policies directly increases the costs of energy consuming industries and
might cause a reduction of international competitiveness and thus might negatively affect the
energy intensive industries. Unilateral abatement action then may result in a movement of
carbon emissions to non-abating countries. This so-called “carbon leakage effect” raises
serious doubts on the environmental effectiveness of unilateral action.
For our analysis of the interactions of different environmental policies under the
Kyoto Protocol and trade liberalization between the EU and the CEECs in the process of the
EU eastern enlargement we use a comparative static multi-sectoral, multi-regional
computational general equilibrium model (CGE). In the analysis we combine three different
environmental policy scenarios with and without trade liberalization between EU and CEEC.
In the first scenario we consider only the domestic measures taken by ANNEX-B countries in
order to fulfil their commitments. In the second scenario the ANNEX-B countries are allowed
to trade with their carbon allowances. In the last scenario all regions are allowed to participate
in carbon emission trading. In the trade liberalization scenario we consider only tariffs as the
most common trade barriers on imported and exported goods. Trade liberalization is then
modelled as an abolishment of the existing tariffs between EU and CEEC. The trading
conditions with other regions remain unchanged. We compute the effective carbon reduction
requirements, which differ considerably from the agreed targets in 1990 as carbon emissions
change until 2010. The analysis shows, that the carbon abatement policies have a direct
impact on the overall comparative advantage and the international competitiveness of
industries. The strict domestic abatement policy implies the loss of competitiveness in the EU
energy intensive industry with negative implications on production and employment.
Accordingly energy intensive production increases in CEEC. The computed carbon leakage
rates comply with those found in the literature. They are reduced by the introduction of
carbon emission trading. As expected, emission trading provides substantial benefits mainly
to the main seller of permits i.e. the former Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern
European Associates. Those regions also benefit from further trade liberalization. The trade
liberalization itself provides large gains for EEAs while it holds only modest gains for EU
member states. It does not show a significant impact on carbon abatement policies, however it
mitigates welfare losses caused by environmental policies.
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Abstract:
The Eastern European Associates (EEA) have committed to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions according to their targets set in the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore since 1993
trade liberalization has taken place between all associated countries and the EU. There is
meanwhile a large quantitative literature on the economic effects of full integration of the
associated countries into the EU as well as on the Kyoto Protocol. However, there is a lack of
quantitative research on the linkage of trade and the environment in the context of the EU
enlargement. In this paper we analyze the interactions of different environmental policies
under the Kyoto Protocol and trade liberalization in the process of eastern enlargement using
a computable general equilibrium model. We find that trade liberalization provides large
gains for EEAs while it holds only modest gains for EU member states. Integration does not
show a significant impact on carbon abatement policies, but mitigates associated welfare
losses.
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11. Introduction
The process of enlargement of the European Union to the associated Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEEC) was launched in 1998.1 The growing literature on the
economic implications of this process deals mainly with the effects of trade liberalization,
which has been taking place between the EU and the transition countries as agreed in the
Europe Agreements since 1993 along with world trade liberalization following the Uruguay
round of the GATT agreement (Baldwin, Francois and Portes 1997, Keuschnigg and Kohler
1999, Keuschnigg, Keuschnigg and Kohler 2000, and Piazolo 2000). The classical trade
literature points out mainly the static perfect competition welfare gains from liberalized trade,
which stems from the improved allocation of available resources. Relaxing the assumptions of
classical trade models and assuming imperfect competition, the existence of unexploited
economies of scale allow to consider the pro-competitive effects of trade liberalization
(Francois and Roland-Holst 1997), which may lead to even higher welfare improvements.
However, the EU enlargement goes much beyond the abolition of trade barriers. The new
accession countries are assumed to implement the full range of community policies such as
anti-dumping policy, state aid, competition policy and environmental policy. Open questions
still remain concerning the participation of the new member states in the EU common
agriculture policy (CAP) and the operation of the EU structural funds (see Agenda 2000, EC
1997 and Europäische Kommission 2000).
In spite of the geographical vicinity, the state of the environment in the accession
countries differs significantly from the EU. The environmental policy in the EU, which
consists of a series of standards and directives, has been developed during a long period of
time mainly as a response to the fast economic growth. In contrast, the environmental burden
in the new accession countries with lower population density and less intensive land use, but
higher demand for energy per unit of production did not appear to be a real constraint on
production activities until the beginning of the 1990s. Cheap and subsidized energy, no
market pricing and weak budget constraints distorted the efficient allocation of the available
resources and led to overuse and excessive pollution (Klarer and Moldan 1997). The
transition countries have committed themselves to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases
according to their targets set in the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997). Thus they do not only
                                                
1 CEECs are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and
the Slovak Republic. While accession negotiations are presently taking place with the first five countries,
membership of the last five countries will be postponed to some later stage (Europäische Kommission 2000).
2have to implement the whole body of EU directives but to develop their own environmental
policy strategies for compliance with this international agreement.
There is meanwhile a bulk of literature providing quantitative evidence on the
economic effects of the full integration of the Central and East European Countries into the
EU (Francois 1998, Baldwin, Francois and Portes 1997) as well as the Kyoto Protocol
(Weyant 1999, IPCC 2001). However, there is a lack of quantitative research on the linkage
of trade and the environment in the context of the EU enlargement. In this paper we analyze
the interactions of different environmental policies under the Kyoto Protocol and trade
liberalization between the EU and the CEECs using a comparative static multi-sectoral, multi-
regional computational general equilibrium model (CGE). We find that the trade liberalization
in terms of abolishment of tariff barriers provides large gains for the CEECs while integration
holds only modest efficiency gains for the EU member states. It does not show a significant
impact on carbon abatement policies, however it mitigates welfare losses caused by
environmental policies. The set up of our paper is as follows. Firstly, we briefly introduce the
most important environmental policy issues in the transition countries and the impacts of the
environmental policies on the pattern of trade. Secondly, we give an overview of the course of
trade liberalization, its presumed economic effects and the impacts on the environment.
Thirdly, we outline a CGE Model, which was constructed for the analysis of economic–
environmental questions. Fourthly, we present and discuss the results of several scenarios
concerning trade and environmental policies in the context of the EU enlargement and the
Kyoto protocol. In the last section we conclude and point out some lines for future research.
2. The state of the environment and environmental policy in Central and Eastern
Europe Countries
 
The real state of the environment in transition countries after 40 years of socialism has
become subject of increasing concern. In spite of different natural and climatic conditions the
transition countries have similar environmental problems, in particular high air, water and soil
pollution. Air pollution is mainly due to SO2, NOx, CO emissions and dust particles, caused
by the combustion of the low–quality coal in power plants and heavy industry (chemistry and
metallurgy). The deposit of SO2, CH4 and N2O has led to higher acidification of the soils, has
contributed to the decrease of soil fertility and ultimately has prevented the growth of new
forests (e.g. the sulfur triangle). The used agricultural methods led to soil erosion and loss of
3soil fertility. Deposits of nitrogen and phosphorus compounds, pesticides and organic
substances have heavily polluted the surface and under water supplies. It is estimated that
about 10 per cent of the whole surface of the CEEC has bad water quality. About 50% of the
population in the CEECs used to live in these areas, which belonged to the most polluted
areas in the world. Birth problems, learning difficulties, respiratory diseases and short life
expectations (e.g. 5 to 7 years shorter in the former Czechoslovakia than in Western Europe)
were the noticeable results. 
The transition countries and the former Soviet Union used to belong to the 15 biggest
global CO2 polluters in the world. Their emissions increased continuously from 800 Mt CO2
in 1950 to 4.800 Mt in 1988. Thereafter the carbon emissions intensity gradual decreased
from 537 t CO2 per million USD of GDP in 1990 to 453 in 1996. These numbers still remain
high as compared to the EU. The transition countries show high per-capita CO2 emissions: 11
tons per capita in comparison to 8 tons per capital in the EU and a global average of 4 tons per
capita in 1992 (Baumert, Petkova and Barbu 1999). Due to the decreased demand of primary
energy, mainly following the economic downturn and substitution for fuels with lower carbon
content (Table 1), a sharp decrease of CO2 emissions has occurred. The fast reforming
countries Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia have managed to reduce their energy
intensity up to 38 % during the 6 years after the start of the reforms. Combined policies such
as controlled increase of fossil fuel, electricity and heat prices with certain degree of
restructuring (breaking the state monopolies in the energy generation and mining companies)
have been applied. However very complex systems of cross-subsidies are still existing
(Lubinski 1996, Sejak 1996). Nonetheless, some energy projections suggest that the CEEC
might not be able to sustain their CO2 commitments of the Kyoto Protocol as they expect to
surpass the base year levels due to the higher economic growth caused by the integration
process (Table 2). 
4Table 1 The structure of the demand for energy (in %) 
                Solid fuels      Liquid fuels      Natural gas      Nuclear          Renewables      
                1990 2010       1990 2010        1990 2010      1990 2010       1990 2010
Poland 74 2 13 18 9 23 0 0 4 7
Hungary 22 6 30 26 31 54 13 12 1 1
Czech Republic 61 42 19 21 12 29 7 7 1 2
Slovenia 27 13 34 39 13 25 23 17 5 8
Baltic countries 22 11 42 34 23 32 13 18 4 7
Romania, Bul- 
garia, Slovakia 55 38 22 22 15 30 6 6 3 5
Total 55 38 22 22 15 30 6 6 3 5
* Source: Cofala et al. (1999)
The environmental legislation in CEEC developed since the 1970s, has remained
incomplete and non-effective. Legally obligated very stringent standards could not be fulfilled
given the available technologies and the lack on the institutions. Therefore, the CEEC face the
difficult problem how to address their serious environmental problems in the current period of
the liberalization of their economies. The traditional advice from economists is to use
economic incentives more extensively (REC 1993, Toman 1994). Learning from the lessons
taken during the transformation, the following points seem to be crucial for the environmental
policy in CEEC:
 Environmental protection matters. 
 The environmental problems in Central and Eastern Europe are far reaching, so the setting
of priorities is necessary.
 Economic restructuring is essential. The achievement of significant results in
environmental policy protection requires reconstruction of those spheres of the economy,
which present the main source of threat to the environment. Sweeping economic reform is
a prerequisite of successful environmental protection (Kaderjak and Powell 1997).
 The cost-efficient strategies matter. The attention should be turned to the support of
economic incentives.
5Table 2 CO2 emissions in the transition countries (in Mton.)*
Region 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Poland 340,9 330,1 330,1 339,6 348,1 358,8 374,4
Hungary 65,8 55,3 56,3 58,7 62,8 70,2 78,1
Czech Republic 145,0 114,6 112,8 120,9 131,3 137,1 145,1
Slovenia 12,5 13,4 13,7 14,8 16,4 17,9 19,8
Baltic countries 89,2 41,7 40,5 42,5 45,9 49,8 57,1
Romania, Bul- 
garia, Slovakia 653,4 555,0 553,4 576,4 604,5 633,8 674,5
Total 1306,8 1110,1 1106,8 1152,9 1209,0 1267,6 1349,0
* Source: Cofala et al. (1999)
The new accession countries are obliged to adopt the whole body of environmental
directives of the EU i.e. the environmental acquis before the accession. However given the
current economic recession and weak assertiveness of the institutions, the direct adoption of
the standards might show to be inefficient and ineffective. The costs of adoption and
fulfillment of the current EU legislature, based mainly on command and control measures,
might become prohibitive for some countries. Furthermore, a relatively small space remains
for the use of cost-efficient instruments, which would lower the implementation costs of
command and control policies through the use of direct incentives. The application of
economic instruments in the CEEC (e.g. pollution fees) has been introduced as a tool of
environmental policy since the 1970s and 1980s. However their cost and profit implications
have become real with the beginning of the economic reforms. Currently the economic
instruments are applied mainly for revenue raising. Their incentive effects on polluters remain
neglected. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia primarily use pollution permits, fees and
non-compliance fees. Such a system generally has two-tiered price levels, where the former
applies for the emissions above the level set by the standard and the later is charged for the
non-compliance with the standard. Hungary on the other hand uses product charges for
damaging goods. The fees are supplemented with a number of fiscal instruments. Only
Slovenia has introduced CO2 taxes. Several specifics for the use of economic instruments in
CEEC have to be considered: (i) the final implications of revenue raising instruments depend
6on the utilization of the revenues, (ii) enforcement and monitoring are often weak, (iii) fee
exemptions are common.
In the following we turn our attention to the fulfillment of the Kyoto targets for the
countries with economies in transition. All the new accession countries have agreed to reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 according to the levels set in the Kyoto protocol.
Hungary and Poland took the opportunity of a “certain degree of flexibility” and selected their
own base year, in order to achieve the target at the best of their ability (Table 3). The CEEC
countries may reap several benefits from coupling the strong domestic action to reduce
greenhouse gases (GHG) with the use of the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol. The
rationale of the Kyoto mechanisms is to achieve given targets by allowing the emission
reductions taking place, where they have the lowest possible costs. This could foster
technology and financial flows to the CEEC, where lower cost abatement possibilities are still
available. Thus combining domestic action and the participation in the flexible mechanisms
can bring additional benefits for CEEC such as (i) upgrading technological capacity and
improving energy efficiency, (ii) improving air quality and health, and (iii) attracting financial
flows by selling the carbon allowances. 
Table 3 Kyoto targets (in %)*
Region                              Base year              Kyoto target
Poland 1998   -6
Hungary 1985-7 -6
Czech Republic 1990 -8
Slovakia 1990 -8
* Source: Baumert, Petkova and Barbu (1999) and own calculations
In the new enlarged EU, several policy options with respect to climate change policy
will emerge (see Michaelowa and Betz 2000). The accession countries may enter the EU
Bubble and take part in the European burden sharing. This will, however only be possible in
the following commitment period, as according to the Kyoto protocol the EU has to stick to
its own bubble (Art. 4.4). The other possibility is a common European environmental and
energy taxation based on the Communication on environmental taxes and charges in the
Single Market (COM 97 / 9) and the Energy tax proposal (COM 97 / 30). An increasing
7number of countries start to use charges or taxes to fulfill their environmental goals. In
addition to Slovenia other countries are also considering CO2 taxes. One of the main reasons
is the presumed positive effect on the labor market, the double dividend (Goulder 1995).
The environmental policies however have several repercussions on other areas such as
international trade flows, capital flows and technology transfers. The environmental policy
action of one country is likely to cause spillovers on other countries. The studies of spillover
effects deal mainly with the impacts of abatement policies on industrial competitiveness and
carbon leakage i.e. the reallocation of industries. In dynamic considerations technology
transfers may generate positive spillovers for the non-abating countries (Grubb 2000).
Competitiveness
International spillovers are mainly transmitted through changes in the terms of trade
(TOT). The terms of trade are measured as the ratio of the countries exports to its imports in
value terms. Terms of trade impacts imply a secondary benefit or burden of the primary
domestic policy. Carbon strategies influence directly the prices of fossil fuels, increase the
production costs of energy consuming industries, and reduce the comparative advantage of
the industries as they increase the relative costs of producing a good in that particular country.
This leads to the reduction of international competitiveness and will negatively affect the
energy intensive industries. However, the country may benefit from the improvement of the
terms of trade, when the emissions arise from the goods being exported, given that the
imperfect substitutability of goods allow to sell those goods for a higher price. In this case, the
overall welfare effect depends on the change in the terms of trade relative to the level of
abatement costs. Non-abating countries suffer symmetric welfare loses from more expensive
imports. However, empirical studies estimate that pollution abatement costs of developing
countries are about 1 per cent (and not exceeding 5 per cent) of the production costs
(Nordström and Vaughan 1999). They find that energy intensive industries tend to be capital
intensive and thus are not very likely to move to capital scarce countries like the transition
economies in Eastern Europe.
Carbon leakage
Unilateral abatement action may result in a movement of carbon emissions into non-
abating countries. This raises serious doubts on the environmental effectiveness of unilateral
8action due to the so-called “carbon leakage effect”. Carbon leakage is defined as the ratio of
the total increase in carbon emissions of the non Annex-B countries to total emissions
abatement by Annex-B countries. Following Rutherford (1995) there are three basic channels,
through which carbon leakage may occur. Firstly, the carbon leakage may arise when in the
abating countries the energy intensive industries lose their competitiveness and production
relocates the emissions in non-abating countries. Secondly, the decrease in energy demand in
large regions due to carbon mitigation policies induce a drop in the world energy prices,
which lead to an increase in demand in the other regions. Thirdly, carbon leakage may be
induced through changes in national income due to the changes of terms of trade. Estimates
for the carbon leakage rate range from about 5 to 35 per cent (EMF 1999).
3. Trade liberalization between CEEC and the EU
According to the decision of the European summit in Copenhagen 1993, the CEEC
may enter the EU as soon as they express their concern about the membership and fulfill the
conditions known as the Copenhagen criteria. These require the democratic organization of
the state justice, the existence of a market economy and the complete adoption of the EU
acquis communtaire. The consideration of the economic development of the transition
countries as well as its environmental implications represents a major challenge since several
features of the transition process have to be kept in mind: (i) the sharp decrease of the
domestic production and exports during the beginning of the reform followed by a slow
growth, (ii) obsolete production capacities with low capital and labor productivity and energy
efficiency, (iii) distorted price systems especially in the energy and agricultural sector due to
the remaining subsidies (Klarer and Moldan 1997).
Most of the CEECs have decided to implement a „shock therapy“ (World Bank 1991
and 1999), the fast economic adjustment to the market. Siebert (1991) considers as main parts
of the reform process macroeconomic stabilization, real microeconomic adjustment and
creation of institutional frameworks. We focus here on the microeconomic adjustment,
especially on the issues concerning the liberalization of trade. The objective of a further
extension of the common market in Europe is the expected increase of welfare through the
reduction of existing structural imperfections, immersion of efficiency gains through
toughened competition and particularly the exploitation of economies of scale. Since 1993 the
gradual reduction of tariffs and quantitative trade barriers between the EU and the CEEC has
9been taking place. This is however far from being free trade. The EU has imposed several
anti-dumping and price-fixing arrangements, which largely restrict the CEEC exports of
particularly “sensitive goods“ such as industry products, apparel and agricultural production.
The trade liberalization succeeds in an asymmetric way, where the CEEC disposes longer
time periods for tariff reductions. This points to the expectation of larger welfare changes on
the side of the CEEC after the completion of the trade liberalization. In the following we are
considering the effects of trade liberalization between the EU and the new accession countries
using a multi-commodity, multi-country trade CGE model. However, full EU membership
involves a much deeper integration of commodity and factor markets through the Single
Market program (which will reduce real trade cost) and includes in addition the adoption of
EU policies in the fields of e.g. anti-dumping, state aids and competition policy, and the
participation in the EU common agricultural policy (CAP) and the European structural funds
(ESF). 
Trade integration holds a clear potential for mutual welfare gains for the incumbent
EU countries as well as for the entrants. Since trade liberalization involves larger tariff cuts
for the CEECs than for the EU (imports from CEECs amount only to 4 per cent of EU
imports, but two-thirds of the CEECs imports are from the EU), initial protection levels
suggest that income gains from enlargement are much higher for CEECs than for the EU
(Baldwin, Francois and Portes 1997). Following Francois (1997) CGE models are able to
capture (i) static allocation effects emphasized by the classical trade theory, (ii) the so-called
pro-competitive effects, stemming from the interactions of different market structures and
trade policies and (iii) the effects of the accumulation of the human and physical capital.
Static efficiency gains from trade
Traditional theory emphasizes static welfare effects. The most common trade barriers
are taxes on imported and exported goods known as tariffs. The reduction of tariff distortions
promises the usual welfare gains. Tariffs tend to shift resources from the export industries to
the import competing industries, through the increase of the domestic price of the imported
goods. Thus they protect the operations of the home industries with regard to import
competition. The EU applies relatively low trade barriers vis-a-vis the rest of the world in
comparison to the accession countries, although the protection of agriculture is considerably
higher. Well-known perfect competition allocation effects on the sectoral level are trade
creation, trade diversion and terms of trade effects. Both trade creation and trade diversion
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result from a fall in the market price as tariffs are abolished. Trade creation implies a lower
price of some goods and necessarily leads to higher consumption. On the contrary, trade
diversion implies a higher real price of some goods and results in lower consumption. The
welfare impacts of the mentioned effects depend on existing substitution possibilities.
Assuming that the price elasticities are positive for all goods, both shifts will be accompanied
by inter-commodity substitution. Therefore, welfare implications are ambiguous (Lipsey
1960). Under the single market the traded goods (EU imports from the CEEC as well as the
CEEC imports from the EU) become duty-free, i.e. the existing trade barriers between those
two regions will be abolished. Furthermore the usual trade costs stemming from the existing
physical and technical barriers (e.g. border controls, different technical standards) will be far
lower. The welfare effects from higher imports from the EU (as well as vice versa) will be
captured by the trade creation effect. Its magnitude depends on the size of adjustment costs in
the CEEC industries and distributional effects emerging from changes in factor prices. On the
other hand, the availability of lower price imports from the new members of the customs
union might cause trade diversion from the former supplier to the new member countries
(Keuschnigg, Keuschnigg and Kohler 2000).
Pro-competitive effects of trade liberalization
Perhaps more important then the static allocation effects are the pro-competitive
effects of trade liberalization (Francois and Roland-Holst 1997). These are trade effects
emerging from the existence of scale economies and imperfect competition. The pressure of
increased competition forces firms with market power that set prices (P) above marginal costs
(MC) down to competitive pricing. The pro-competitive effects may relate to increased
economies of scale, the falling of the production costs (lowering the mark-up) and the
increase of product varieties (the expansion of output). This effect is comparable to the gain
that could be achieved in a closed economy by eliminating the monopoly distortion. It adds to
the usual comparative gains from trade. The pro-competitive (product expansion) effect is
decomposed into two effects (Markusen 1995):
X
X
ACXXACpXMCp xxx 







	 )()( (1)
11
The first term on the right hand side is the so-called pure profit effect, arising from the fact
that imperfectly competitive firms set prices above average costs. The second term describes
the decreasing-average cost effect, which reflects the gains from the fall of average costs of
the production as firms expand output. The third source of gains from trade is the firm exit
effect that reflects the trade-off between the existence of more firms on the market and the
desirable entire industry product due to a downward sloping average cost curve. Free entry
drives profits to zero and with the opening of trade some firms will exit due to negative
profits. Fewer firms will then produce the same output with lower average costs. In addition,
the recent literature emphasizes the increase of varieties (Markusen 1981, Helpman and
Krugman 1985).
Accumulation effects
Cross-country studies show considerable inconsistencies between results from static
numerical studies and linkages between trade policies and incomes through investments. The
static effects fail to account for the relationship between trade, investment and growth, which
is fairly well established empirically. According to classical growth theory the changes in
saving and investment patterns provide a potential for accumulation. The accumulation effects
capture the changes in the amounts of resources through the interaction between trade policy
and capital accumulation (Francois, McDonald and Nordström 1996). 
The effects of free trade on the environment occur mainly indirectly through the
changes in production and consumption patterns. There are four categories of environmental
effects on trade. The scale effects arise from higher growth, which stems from the trade
liberalization. The increase in production causes more emissions. Considering the
environment as a consumption good, the increased personal income may lead to an increased
demand for a wide range of goods e.g. for environmental amenities. This illustrates the
environmental benefits from trade. However environmental quality is a public good and thus
the rising demand for environmental quality needs to be transformed into more restrictive
environmental standards. Finally economic growth is followed by a decline of the population,
which is one of the major sources of pressure on natural resources. Product and technology
effects capture the change in products varieties that become available after the trade
liberalization, as well as the easier access to foreign technologies. The increase of pollution
often leads to an over-proportional increase in environmental damage. Thus decentralization
might alleviate the damage from pollution through the spatial distribution of production i.e.
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shifting the production to other regions. This is called the spatial effect. Finally, trade
liberalization alters the allocation of the resources between the production sectors, the so-
called composition effect (Bommer 1998, Nordström and Vaughan 1999).
4. Description of the CGE Model
Computable general equilibrium modeling provides a useful and widely used tool for
applied policy analysis and is particularly suited to the analysis of tax and trade policy issues.
There is a need for such a tool, especially in transition economies, which are currently
designing their new economic policies. This section presents the main characteristics of a
comparative-static multi-sector computable general equilibrium model of the world economy
designed for the medium-run economic analysis of environmental constraints and trade policy
(see Appendix for the algebraic model formulation). The analysis covers 7 sectors and 5
regions as described in Table 4. The regional aggregation covers beside the EU-15 (EUR) and
the Central European Associates (CEA), that is Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, the most important regions of the Kyoto protocol, i.e. the
other Annex-B countries (RAB) taking on legally binding commitments on greenhouse gas
emissions, particularly Australia, Canada, Japan, Indonesia and the US, the Former Soviet
Union (FSU) as a main supplier of “hot air”, and other countries without carbon abatement
requirements (ROW) such as Brazil, China, India. The regional aggregation follows the
aggregation of the GTAP4 database. However, it should be kept in mind that the costs and
benefits of enlargement are unevenly distributed across present EU member countries as well
as across different central and eastern European countries depending on the respective trade
share that is exposed to potential competition (see Breuss and Schebeck 1999). With respect
to environmental policy, the EU has done a reallocation of the EU bubble target among the
member states of the bubble in 1998 leading again to a very uneven distribution of emission
reduction requirements (Michaelowa and Betz 2000). The sectoral aggregation captures key
dimensions in the analysis of greenhouse gas abatement such as differences in carbon
intensities and the degree of substitutability across energy goods and carbon-intensive non-
energy goods. The energy goods identified in the model are coal (COL), natural gas (GAS),
crude oil (CRU), refined oil products (OIL) and electricity (ELE). The non-energy sectors
include important carbon-intensive and energy-intensive industries (EIS), which are
potentially most affected by carbon abatement policies and other, non-energy intensive
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sectors (Y). The primary factors in the model include labor (LAB), physical capital (CAP)
and fossil-fuel resources (RES). Factor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
Labor and physical capital are treated as perfectly mobile across sectors. Fossil-fuel resources
are sector-specific. All factors are immobile between regions. However, the single market
foresees more integrated factor markets leading eventually to free movements of the
production factors within the enlarged single market.
Production 
Within each region, each producing sector is represented by a single-output producing
firm which chooses input and output quantities in order to maximize profits. In the model
nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions are employed to specify the
substitution possibilities in domestic production between capital, labor, energy and material
(non-energy) intermediate inputs. In non-fossil fuel production (ELE, EIS, OIL, Y)
intermediate non-energy goods and crude oil are employed in fixed proportions with an
aggregate of energy, capital and labor at the top level. At the second level, a CES function
describes the substitution possibilities between labor and the aggregate of capital and the
energy composite. At the third level, capital and the energy composite trade off with a
constant elasticity of substitution. The energy aggregate is, in turn, a nested CES composite of
electricity and primary energy inputs. The primary energy composite is defined as a CES
function of coal and a CES aggregate of refined oil and natural gas. Fossil fuel production
(COL, CRU and GAS) is a CES composite of a sector-specific fossil-fuel resource and a
Leontief aggregate of labor, capital and intermediate inputs. The substitution elasticity
between the specific factor and the Leontief composite is calibrated in consistency with
exogenously given price elasticities of fossil fuel supplies.
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Table 4 Regions and sectoral aggregation
Sectors Countries
COL Coal EUR EU15
CRU Crude oil CEA Eastern Europe
GAS Natural gas FSU Former Soviet Union
OIL Refined oil products RAB Rest of Annex B
ELE Electricity ROW Rest of the world
EIS Energy intensive sectors
Y Other sectors
Private and government demand
Private demand for goods and services is derived from utility maximization of a
representative household subject to a budget constraint. Total income of the representative
household consists of factor income and transfers. In our comparative-static framework,
overall investment demand is fixed at the reference level. Utility is derived from
consumption. Final demand of the representative agent is given as a CES composite of energy
aggregate and non-energy consumption composite. Substitution patterns within the energy
aggregate and the non-energy consumption bundle are reflected via Cobb-Douglas functions. 
The government distributes transfers and provides a public good (including public
investment), which is produced with commodities purchased at market prices. In all
simulations, we impose revenue-neutrality in the sense that the level of public provision is
fixed. Subject to this equal-yield constraint, additional revenues from environmental taxes get
recycled through cuts in labor costs (social insurance payments).
International trade
All goods are traded in the world markets. Following Armington (1969), foreign trade
modeling involves international product differentiation in the sense that imported and
domestically produced goods of the same kind are treated as incomplete substitutes. The
aggregate amount of each good is divided among imports and domestic production.
Intermediate as well as final demands are (nested CES) Armington composites of domestic
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and imported varieties. The assumption of product differentiation permit the model to match
bilateral trade with cross-hauling of trade and avoids unrealistically strong specialization
effects in response to exogenous changes in trade (tax) policy. Bilateral trade flows are
subject to export taxes, tariffs and transportation costs and calibrated to the base year 1995.
Carbon abatement
GHGs and related gases have direct radiative forcing effects in the atmosphere. The
various gases result from industrial production, fossil fuel consumption and household
activities. The Kyoto Protocol includes carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)
as gases subject to control. We do not consider the abatement of a complete basket of GHG
emissions from all energy-related sources as in the Kyoto Protocol but focus on carbon
dioxide abatement from fossil fuel consumption given that it constitutes the bulk of the
contribution to global warming. Carbon emissions are associated with fossil fuel consumption
in production, investment, government and private demand. Carbon is treated as a Leontief
(fixed coefficient) input into production and consumption activities. Each unit of a fuel emits
a known amount of carbon where different fuels have different carbon intensities. The applied
carbon coefficients, which are assumed to be constant across regions, are 25 MT carbon per
EJ for coal, 14 MT carbon per EJ for gas and 20 MT carbon per EJ for refined oil. 
Carbon policies are introduced via an additional constraint that holds carbon
emissions to a specified limit. The solution of the model gives a shadow value on carbon
associated with this carbon constraint. This dual variable or shadow price can be interpreted
as the price of carbon permits in a carbon permit system or as the CO2 tax that would induce
the carbon constraint in the model. The shadow value of the carbon constraint equals the
marginal cost of reduction. It indicates the incremental cost of reducing carbon at the carbon
constraint. The total costs represent the resource cost or dead-weight loss to the economy of
imposing carbon constraints. Carbon emission constraints induce substitution of fossil fuels
with less expensive energy sources (inter-fuel fuel switching), fuel-non-fuel substitution or
employment of less expensive manufacturing and production techniques (energy savings). On
the consumption side, higher energy prices imply a change in the consumption mix which
results in a loss of welfare (consumer surplus). The only means of abatement are hence inter-
fuel and fuel-non-fuel substitution and a reduction of intermediate and final consumption.
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Parameterization
Data from two different sources are combined to yield a consistent benchmark data set
for 1995. The main data source underlying the model is the GTAP version 4 database that
represents global production and trade data for 45 countries and regions, 50 commodities and
5 primary factors (McDougall, Elbehri and Truong 1998). In addition we use OECD/IEA
energy statistics (IEA 1996) for 1995. Reconciliation of these data sources yields the
benchmark data of our model (see Babiker and Rutherford 1997). For this application the data
set has been aggregated as shown in Table 4. The given set of benchmark quantities and
prices together with the substitution elasticities given in the Appendix completely specify the
benchmark equilibrium.
5. Interpretation of the results
The literature provides several available estimates of the costs and benefits of the EU
enlargement process using CGE models. Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) provide two
sets of result. In the so-called “conservative” scenario they capture only the allocation and
accumulation effects of the trade liberalization between the EU and CEEC. All the regions
seem to gain from it, the CEEC, however, gain much more than the EU in relative terms due
to the positive income effects and a reduction of previously higher previous distortions.
Furthermore, the improved access to the EU markets leads to a fast increase of CEEC exports.
In the less conservative scenario the CEECs are allowed to join the EU. This has clear
implications on the decrease of the uncertainty followed by a decrease of the risk premiums.
The results are in the same fashion as in the former scenario, however the gains increase due
to the risk premium effect. 
Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999) and Keuschnigg, Keuschnigg and Kohler (2000)
consider the impacts of the EU enlargement on Austria and Germany. In their first scenario
they assess a bilateral tariff removal. Their full accession scenario contains all main issues of
the EU enlargement process (e.g. trade liberalization, budgetary implications and common
agriculture policy). The study concludes, that there are positive welfare benefits for Austria as
well as for Germany from the closer integration of commodity markets. The model however
captures also the adjustment pressure from the increased import competition and the loss of
some of the external protection from the previous trade regime. In addition to this, all the
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members of the enlarged EU will have to face a more expensive Union with a clear fiscal
implication.
Piazolo (2000) considers the welfare effects of Poland’s integration into the EU. The
economic effects of the EU membership contain the overall abolishment of tariff barriers
between the EU and Poland and the adoption of common external tariffs. The study includes
also the implementation of the single market, which will decrease the real trade costs through
the abolition of custom and fiscal controls and the harmonization of standards. The results of
the simulations are mainly in line with the two previous models and show an increase in
welfare in all scenarios. Other studies focus e.g. on the specifics of the common agriculture
policy and fiscal issues (Frandsen and Jensen 2001).
The economic impacts of different trade and environmental policies in the process of
the EU enlargement are analyzed in this section. We extend this estimates of the effects of the
EU enlargement through the inclusion of alternative environmental policies and run three
environmental policy scenarios under two different patterns of trade. We simulate a
completely liberalized trade between EU vis-a-vis CEEC, where all trade barriers are set
equal to zero. The three different scenarios of environmental policy are distinguished by the
different degree of flexibility that is allowed in reaching the Kyoto commitments:
[DOMESTIC]  Each country applies only domestic measures (e.g. a carbon tax) to comply
with their commitments in the Kyoto Protocol. There is no international trade
in carbon permits.
[ANNEX] The Annex–B countries are allowed to trade with their carbon allowances.
[GLOBAL] All regional restrictions on trade with carbon permits are relaxed and all
countries may participate in carbon trade.
Those three scenarios are considered within two different patterns of international trade
between EU and CEEC, while the trade conditions vis-a-vis third countries remain
unchanged:
[NO-LIB] No trade liberalization between EU and CEEC takes place.
[LIB] EU and CEEC liberalize trade vis-a-vis. Tariff trade barriers between EU and
CEEC are abolished.
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It is important to notice that the effective reduction requirements for the so-called
Annex-B countries that accepted quantified limitations on emissions, the effective reduction
rates will considerably differ from their agreed targets in 1990 as carbon emissions change
until 2010. Table 5 recounts the effective reduction rates for 2010, following energy
projections (DOE 1998). We notice that the effective cutback of the EU is more than twice in
2010 as compared to the agreed commitments. On the other hand FSU and CEA provide
disposes of hot air, as their effective commitments will not become binding. 
Table 5 Nominal and effective CO2 reduction requirements
Region Nominal reduction Effective reduction
   (in % wrt 1990)    (in % wrt 2010)
CEA -7 4.2
FSU 0 31.7
RAB -5.5 -28
EUR -7.7 -16.6
ROW 0 0
DOMESTIC – Domestic abatement policies.
In our first scenario, each country has to fulfill its commitments by its own measures
(e.g. a carbon tax or a domestic tradable permit system) without any trading across the
regions. The countries use the most efficient economic instruments to reduce their emissions.
As those become scarcer, the price of abatement increases. Abatement takes place until the
marginal abatement costs equal the carbon tax or the permit price. The results are shown in
Table 6.
The zero values of the marginal abatement costs indicate no carbon cut
requirements (ROW) or no binding commitments in FSU (“Hot air”). Even with some hot air
potential CEA is facing small carbon taxes since energy intensive production is increased,
driving carbon emissions above the carbon allowances. High carbon taxes in EUR and RAB
in comparison with CEA promises further cost savings from the shift of some abatement to
the CEA. The welfare impacts are measured as a percentage change in real consumption with
respect to the BaU scenario thus they do not include environmental benefits. Welfare effects
19
of integration are much higher for the CEA than for EUR. This result confirms the
calculations of e.g. Baldwin, Francois and Portes 1997, Gasiorek, Smith and Venables 1997.
The welfare implications of environmental action are ambiguous due to spillover effects (see
Böhringer and Rutherford 2000, Böhringer and Löschel 2002). The spillover effects might
harm the FSU and ROW. 
Table 6 Marginal abatement costs (in USD per ton CO2) and welfare effects (in %)
Region                     Marginal abatement costs            Welfare effects
                  NO_LIB         LIB          NO_LIB        LIB
CEA 0.19 0.19 0.44 1.05
FSU 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.01
EUR 44.34 44.91 -0.35 -0.30
RAB 56.36 56.41 -0.68 -0.69
ROW 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.10
Comparative advantage and trade patterns
Carbon abatement policies have a direct impact on the overall comparative advantage
and the international competitiveness of industries. The CEA countries possess a comparative
advantage in the heavy industry, which has a long tradition in the transition economies due to
the low cost of mostly subsidized energy. The strict domestic abatement policy implies the
loss of the competitiveness in the EU energy intensive industry with negative implications on
production and employment. Accordingly, energy intensive production rises in CEA and falls
in EUR. With lower carbon prices under Annex-B trading and global trading the comparative
advantage of the CEA energy intensive industries disappears and the effects on production
effects are reversed. Trade liberalization deepens these detrimental effects of environmental
policy (Table 7). Domestic environmental policy in all countries leads to a slight decrease in
output of almost all sectors in the CEA with exception to the energy intensive goods and
electricity production. This might be explained as a consequence of the increase in imports of
the EU due to the increased competitiveness of energy intensive industries in CEA (Table 8).
The cooperative environmental policy (i.e. Annex B and global carbon permit trading) leads
to a substantial decrease in energy intensive production especially in the coal and surprisingly
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gas industry. Carbon leakage rates mimic the effects of carbon abatement policies on energy
intensive production (Table 9). Carbon leakage is the relocation of the energy intensive
industries or the increase of imports of energy intensive products. The calculations show
leakage rates within the range found in the literature. Carbon trading lessens the magnitude of
carbon leakage.
Table 7 Impacts of the environmental policies in the energy intensive sector (in %)
Region                            NO-LIB                                                         LIB
                    DOMESTIC  ANNEX  GLOBAL            DOMESTIC   ANNEX   GLOBAL
CEA 4.01 -5.83 -2.07 2.84 -8.04 -4.04
EUR -1.26 0.30 0.66 -1.20 0.44 0.79
Table 8 Energy intensive trade with trade liberalization between EU and CEEC (in %)
Region                                   NO-LIB                                                 LIB
                              DOMESTIC             ANNEX            DOMESTIC              ANNEX
                             EUR        CEA       EUR       CEA       EUR       CEA       EUR       CEA
CEA -20.91 -32.46 5.93 -7.69
FSU -10.23 23.00 -56.59 -10.17 18.44 22.43 -36.74 -39.78
EUR -2.06 -0.94 -1.36 0.81
RAB -32.95 -8.09 -22.52 1.16 -10.93 -7.89 5.83 0.36
ROW -18.88 11.20 -16.93 0.71 7.68 11.37 13.34 7.48
Table 9 Carbon leakage (in %)
Leakage rates                        NO-LIB                                                 LIB
                              DOMESTIC             ANNEX            DOMESTIC              ANNEX
19.91 15.12 19.98 15.23
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ANNEX–B and GLOBAL: The impacts of the carbon emission permits trading.
In the trading scenarios the Annex-B countries are allowed to benefit from the flexible
instruments introduced in the Kyoto protocol. In this scenario especially the degree of the
recovery in Russia and particularly the Central European Associates is of importance, as they
will become the largest suppliers of the emission permits on the world market. The flexibility
of meeting the Kyoto targets allows the price of the permit to be lower then in the no trading
case. The extending of the carbon allowance trading enables to exploit further efficiency gains
from lower cost abatement possibilities in the rest of the world (Table 10). This lowers
accordingly the negative welfare impacts in the EUR and RAB, who undertake the main
abatement effort (Table 11). The decrease in welfare of CEA and FSU follows from the
decrease of the carbon price. Further trade liberalization does not influence the marginal
abatement costs, however contributes to an increase in welfare of the EU and CEA. The
changes in the sectoral output as well as trade impacts arise as a response to the specific
environmental policies since emission trading will have a direct impact on the relative prices
of the products traded on world markets. These impacts will however be different between
individual countries, depending on the composition and direction of their imports and exports. 
Table 10 Marginal abatement costs in the trading scenarios with no trade liberalization
between EU and CEEC (in USD per ton CO2)
                                           NO-LIB                                             LIB
                              ANNEX           GLOBAL              ANNEX               GLOBAL
Region        MAC  Welfare    MAC  Welfare      MAC  Welfare      MAC  Welfare
CEA 19.37 0.88 9.61 0.33 19.48 1.44 9.66 0.93
FSU 19.37 6.28 9.61 2.83 19.48 6.39 9.66 2.91
EUR 19.37 -0.15 9.61 -0.02 19.48 -0.09 9.66 -0.04
RAB 19.37 -0.36 9.61 -0.18 19.48 -0.37 9.66 -0.19
ROW 0.00 -0.04 9.61 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 9.66 -0.08
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Table 11 Carbon trade (in Mtons CO2)
                                                  NO-LIB                                             LIB
    Region                       ANNEX        GLOBAL                  ANNEX          GLOBAL
CEA 183.83 108.21 184.18 108.36
FSU 1298.05 1052.94 1298.99 1052.95
EUR -325.90 -482.66 -330.78 -488.28
RAB -1155.96 -1652.45 -1152.37 -1651.26
ROW - 973.96 - 978.26
6. Conclusions and some remarks for further research
This paper analyzes the impacts of different environmental policies in the process of
the EU enlargement. Since the Europe agreements between the EU and the CEEC, a
scheduled liberalization of trade flows has occurred. We have considered the same set of
environmental policies under the current trade arrangements and under free trade between EU
and CEEC. The calculations confirm other research, e.g. by Baldwin, Francois and Portes
(1997) or Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1997), showing that large gains are in stake for the
CEECs while integration holds only modest efficiency gains for the EU member states.
Integration shows very slight impacts on environmental policies and marginal abatement
costs. The price of the carbon penalty is almost unchanged. However, integration mitigates to
a large extent the welfare losses caused by environmental policy. Under domestic carbon
abatement policies, the EU energy intensive industry lose competitiveness and accordingly,
energy intensive production rises in CEA and falls in EUR. This comparative advantage
disappears with lower carbon prices under Annex-B trading and global trading. Carbon
leakage rates mimic the effects of carbon abatement policies on energy intensive production.
As expected, emission trading provides substantial benefits mainly to the main seller of
permits i.e. the former Soviet Union and the central and eastern European associates. Those
regions also benefit from further trade liberalization. On the other hand the welfare losses of
the EU under the trading regimes are very small. Trade liberalization even offsets part of it.
There are several issues constituting the need for further research and model
improvement. Starting from the development of the suitable and detailed database covering
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disaggregated social accounting matrices for the associated countries. Detailed trade flows as
well as information about remaining trade barriers (e.g. estimation of the non-tariff trade
barriers) are necessary. The market structure in the economies in transition is far from perfect
competition, thus several market imperfections in production, in the labor market etc. and
short-time adjustments have to be considered. Important fiscal features of the EU, as the
structural funds and common agricultural policy are still not incorporated. The extension of
the model to capture other greenhouse gases especially N2O and CH4, resulting from
agriculture, might be useful.
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Appendix
Algebraic model summary 
Two classes of conditions characterize the competitive equilibrium: zero profit
conditions and market clearance conditions. The former class determines activity levels and
the latter determine price levels. In our algebraic exposition, the notation zi  is used to
denote the profit function of sector i where z is the name assigned to the associated production
activity. Differentiating the profit function with respect to input and output prices provides
compensated demand and supply coefficients (Shephard’s lemma), which appear
subsequently in the market clearance conditions. Table A1 explains the notations for variables
and parameters. Table A2 gives an overview of key elasticities and parameter specifications
For the sake of transparency, we do not write down the explicit functional forms but instead
use the acronyms CET (constant elasticity of transformation), CES (constant elasticity of
substitution), CD (Cobb-Douglas) and LT (Leontief) to indicate the class of functional form
in place.
Zero profit conditions
Aggregate output:    Y,,  , , 0Yi i i j j I iP CES PR LT PA PK PL i F       	
  , , ,  , , 0
Y Y Y
i i n n N CRU i iP LT PA PA CES PL CES PK PE i V       	 (A1)
Energy aggregate:    , , , 0E Y Y Y Yi i ELE COL GAS OILPE CES PA CES PA CES PA PA i V       	 (A2)
Armington aggregate:   2 2, 0A d CO COdi i i i di= PA CES P PM P a =   (A3)
Aggregate imports:  , , 0M r r si i i= PM CES P PFX =  (A4)
Investment:  ,INV Yi i IPINV LT PA    (A5)
Public demand:   , ,, 0Z Z Zn n N e e E  PZ CD PA CES PA     (A6)
Final demand:     , ,, 0C C Ce e E n n NPC CES CD PA CD PA     (A7)
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Market Clearance Conditions
Labor:
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Domestic output:
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Import aggregate:
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Armington aggregate:
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Private demand:      
r
f f
f
PC C = PL L PK K PQ Q PINV INV PC B          (A15)
Government consumption:   2 2COPZ Z = P CO other taxes   (A16)
Government output: Z Z (A17)
Investment: INV INV (A18)
Carbon emission constraint: 22 d COi di
d i
CO A a (A19)
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Table A1 Sets, activity and price variables, endowments 
Sets:
I, i, j Sectors and goods (13 commodities)
E, e Energy goods (COL, CRU, OIL, GAS and ELE)
N, n Non energy goods
F, f Fossil fuels (COL, CRU, GAS)
V, v Non fossil fuels
r, s Regions
d Demand categories: Y = industry, C = household, Z = government
Activity variables:
Yi Aggregate production 
Ei Aggregate energy input
d
iA Armington aggregate
Mi Import aggregate
C Private consumption 
Z Government consumption 
Price variables:
Pi Output price
PEi Price of aggregate energy
d
iPA Price of Armington aggregate
PMi Price of import aggregate
PU Utility price index 
PC Price of aggregate household consumption 
PZ Price of government consumption
PL Wage rate 
PK Price of capital services
PQf Rent from natural resource
PINV Price of investment demand
PCO2 Price of carbon permit
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Endowments:
L Aggregate labor endowment 
K Aggregate capital endowment 
fQ Endowment of natural resource
r
B Balance of payment surplus
2CO Endowment with carbon emission rights 
Other parameters:
2CO
ia Carbon coefficient per unit
Table A2 Overview of key elasticities and parameter specifications
Substitution elasticities in non-fossil fuel production
Capital-labor-energy vs. intermediates 0
Capital-energy vs. labor 0.6
Capital vs. energy 0.8
Electricity vs. primary energy inputs 0.1
Gas-oil vs. coal 0.5
Gas vs. oil 2
Substituion elasticities in final demand
Energy goods vs. non-energy goods 0.5
Non-energy goods vs. non-energy goods 1
Energy goods vs. energy goods 1
Substitution elasticities in government demand
Fossil fuels vs. non-fossil fuels 1
Fossil fuels vs. fossil fuels 0.3
Elasticities in international trade (Armington)
Substitution elasticity between imports vs. domestic inputs 4
Other Parameters
Supply elasticity for crued oil 1
Supply elasticity for gas 1
Supply elasticity for coal 0.5
